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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND

ORGANIZATION

ARTICLE
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ON INTERSTATE COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL
MATTERS
M. Cherif Bassiounit
I.

THE PECULIARITIES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

International criminal law' has always been a challenging
subject, if for no other reason than its pluri-disciplinary nature.
t President, International Association of Penal Law; President, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences: Professor of Law and President, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University. This article is being published
simultaneously in Germany as part of the procedings of an international workshop on
"Principles and Procedures for a New Transnational Criminal Law", held at the MaxPlanck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg, Germany, May
21-25 [19911.
' Although the term "International Criminal Law" may not have one universally
agreed upon definition, the term embraces the following concepts: One, the application
by an independent state of its criminal laws to acts committed by its own subjects or by
foreigners outside the territory of the state.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

5-6 (Gerhard

0. W. Mueller & Edward M. Wise eds., 1965). Two, the obligation of a state created by a
bilateral or multilateral treaty or international customary law to sanction certain acts
under its own national criminal law. Id. at 6-8. A quintessential example of the type of
offence which a state has a duty to punish under treaties and international customary
law is piracy. Id. at 8-9. Another such example is war crimes. A breach of the rules of
warfare by the arm forces of one state may subject those persons captured by the enemy
to punishment for the illegal acts committed prior to capture. Id. at 9-10. Three, crimes
which, because of their character, are punishable in most civilized countries. Id at 10-11.
Such offences are said to be offences against the law of nations. Id. Four, modalities of
co-operation between states to assist in the administration of justice. Id. at 11-12. An
extradition treaty is one example.
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Indeed, international criminal law is the convergence of international and regional law, and national criminal laws and procedures, with the addition of their respective related legal subjects.
Today, international criminal law also includes the international, regional, and national protection of human rights.'
Perhaps the most important peculiarities of international
criminal law are the different international, regional and domestic legal processes through which these multiple areas of the law
interact. The techniques, modalities,' structures and participants of these legal processes are radically different and no system or policy exists which regulates their interaction in the development and application of international criminal law." Thus,
international criminal law is, all too frequently, the product of
circumstantial opportunities.
The subject-matter of international criminal law encompasses: 1) crimes (both transnational and international)', which
constitute its substantive part, and 2) enforcement modalities
which constitute its procedural part. The latter, however, does
See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. No. 5.
3 The term modalities refers to:
[the] ways and means of international co-operation in penal matters, such as extradition, various forms of investigative and judicial assistance, including letters
and commissions rogatory, service of writs and record of decisions, appearances of
witnesses abroad, transfer of proceedings, transfer of foreign prisoners and execution of sentences abroad, including supervision of the conditionally released in
other countries ....
Seventh United Nations Congress on Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders at 16, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 121/22/Rev.1 (1986).
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Characteristicsof InternationalCriminal Law Conventions,
in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMEs 6-7 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
8 Some distinguish international crimes as either transnational or international.
Transnational crimes are predicated on the fact that their commission involves the crossing of state boundaries. Examples of transnational crimes include the theft of cultural
property or the taking of hostages. International crimes, on the other hand, impact on
the peace and security of humankind or substantially affect the common human values
of the international community. Aggression, genocide, and torture are traditionally classified as international crimes.
The distinction between transnational and international crimes is obviously arbitrary and does not necessarily add much to the understanding of offenses that are internationally criminalized. Such criminalization may be predicated on certain policy factors.
Defining a crime as either transnational or international, based upon the reason supporting its criminalization, is only relevant in determining the specific modalities of
enforcement.
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not only apply to international and transnational crimes, but
also to the enforcement of national criminal law whenever it requires inter-state cooperation. Such a broad scope of international criminal law, coupled with diverse and multiple sources of
law, requires at least a cohesive policy for this peculiar branch of
the law.'
Substantive international criminal law is a product of international legal processes. Thus, transnational and international
crimes are formulated by international and regional law-making
bodies and are embodied in multilateral conventions. 7 There are
315 international instruments, developed mostly on an ad hoc
basis between 1815-1988, which cover twenty-two categories of
offenses.' Typically, substantive international criminal law in' See Albin Eser, Basic Issues Concerning Transnational Cooperation in Criminal
Cases: A Problem in Outline, Report of German Scientific Contribution to the Eighth
United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders, (Havana, Cuba, August-September 1990).
7 Customary international law also creates substantive international crimes as in the
case of piracy and war crimes. Emphasis on customary international law and multilateral
conventions to the exclusion of other such "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" is a recognition of the need for international criminal legislation to satisfy
the requirements of the principles of legality, which are part of domestic criminal law.
Interestingly, these principles of law and principles of legality are cognizable to international law because they rise to the level of general principles of law, even though general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations cannot be the basis for international
crimes. For the sake of historical accuracy, there was only one instance where "general
principles" were deemed to be creative of international criminal law and that was under
the law of the London Charter of August 8, 1945 annexed to the Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 82 U.N.T.S.
279, the IMT at Nuremberg interpreted the phrase "crimes against humanity" found in
Article 6(c) as relying on "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." See

Roger S. Clark, Crimes Against Humanity, in

THE NUREMBEEG TRIAL AND INTERNA-

177, 193-4 (George Ginsburgs & Vladimir N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990).
' The twenty-two categories of offences are as follows: aggression; war crimes; crimes
against humanity; unlawful use of weapons; genocide; apartheid; slavery and slave-related practices; torture; unlawful human experimentation; piracy; aircraft hijacking;
threat and use of force against diplomats and other international protected persons; taking of civilian hostages; drug offenses; international traffic in obscene materials; destruction or theft of national treasures; environmental protection; theft of nuclear materials;
unlawful use of the mails; interference with sub-marine cables; falsification and counterfeiting; and bribery of foreign public officials. See M. CHERIF BASSlOUI, INTERNATIONAL

TIONAL LAW

CRIMES:

DIGEST INDEX OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS

1815-1985 (2 vols. 1986) [hereinaf-

ter DIGEST], which provides 312 international instruments up to 1985. The three post1985 instruments are: Montreal Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Servicing Civil Aviation, adopted by the International Civil Aviation
Organization, February 24, 1988, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 627 (1988); Convention and Pro-
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struments deal with any of the following ten mechanisms to
combat criminality at the international level:
1. Explicit recognition of proscribed conduct as constituting an
international crime, or a crime under international law;
2. Implicit recognition of the penal nature of the act by establishing a duty to prohibit, prevent, prosecute, punish, or the like;
3. Criminalization of the proscribed conduct;
4. Duty or right to prosecute;
5. Duty or right to punish the proscribed conduct;
6. Duty or right to extradite;
7. Duty or right to cooperate in prosecution, punishment (including judicial assistance);
8. Establishment of a criminal jurisdictional basis;
9. Reference to the establishment of an international criminal
court or international tribunal with penal characteristics; and
10. No defense of obedience to superior orders.9
Of the above, six are among the very same modalities and
techniques of inter-state penal cooperation which are also applicable to domestic crimes. They are as follows: recognition of foreign penal judgments, extradition, mutual legal assistance in penal matters, transfer of penal proceedings, transfer of prisoners,
and most recently, the seizure and forfeiture of the illicit proceeds of crime.' °
tocol From the International Conference on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation, March 10, 1988, I.M.O. Doc. SVA/CON/15, reprinted
in 27 I.L.M. 668; United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, December 19, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 82/15, reprinted
in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) [hereinafter UN Drug Conventionl.
For the history of the UN Drug Convention, see United Nations Economic and Social Counsel, Final Act of the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Vienna, Austria, Nov. 25, Dec. 20, 1988; see also United Nations, Division of Narcotic Drugs,
Extradition for Drug-Related Offences: A study of existing extradition practices and suggested guidelines for use in concluding extradition treaties, STfNar/5 (1985).
' M. Cherif Bassiouni, Characteristicsof InternationalCriminal Law Conventions,
in I INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 7 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986). Most recently, the seizure and forfeiture of assets from illicit activity has been instituted as an
eleventh modality of international penal enforcement.
10 The seizure and forfeiture of the illicit proceeds of crime has been an element of
inter-state penal cooperation since the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which contained such a provision. See UN Drug Convention, supra note 8, Art. 5. Article 5 of the UN Drug Convention provides, in pertinent part:
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These modalities of inter-state cooperation are the very essence of enforcement and, without them, international, transnational, and even national crimes would be deprived of international enforcement methods. These mechanisms are found in
substantive international criminal law conventions. Yet, they
tend to be limited to one or a few provisions, are referred to in
broad or general terms, and are ill-defined and lack specificity.
This peculiarity can be explained in part by the lack of technical
legal competence of the diplomats and other officials to whom
the drafting of these instruments is entrusted. However, when
these modalities are the subject of specialized or particularized
conventions, it appears that states send more specialized officials
to negotiate and draft these instruments. This practice results in
more detailed and specific provisions,11 and in part, explains
Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of . . . proceeds derived from . . . narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, materials and equipment or other instrumentalities used in [the manufacture or distribution of narcotic drugs]
Each Party shall also adopt such measures as may be necessary to enable its
competent authorities to identify, trace, and freeze or seize proceeds, property,
instrumentalities or any other things [used in or derived from narcotics manufacture or distribution].
the Party in whose terFollowing a request made . ., by another Party ...
ritory [the things requested] are situated shall . ., submit the request to its competent authorities . . . .
Id.
The 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, contains even more detailed and precise provisions
governing the seizure and forfeiture of assets. E.T.S. No. 141, November 8, 1990, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 148 [hereinafter COE Convention].
" This phenomenon is, perhaps, best illustrated by comparing the provisions on extradition and mutual legal assistance contained in the various Council of Europe instruments on European Inter-state Cooperation and the provisions contained in various multilateral instruments such as the following: the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs and the 1972 Amended Protocols, 520 U.N.T.S. 151, 118 U.S.T 1407, T.I.A.S. No.
6298; the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1019 U.N.T.S. 0, T.I.A.S. No.
9725; the 1979 Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. G.A.S G.A. Res. 34/145
(xxxix), 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 46, 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, reprinted in 18 LL.M.
1456 (1979); and the 1970 Hague Convention on Aircraft Hijacking, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, 22
U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192. A comparison of these instruments reveals that these
provisions, as contained in multilateral instruments, are much more limited than similar
provisions in single conventions. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: DiGEST INDEX OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 1815-1985 (2 vols. 1986). See also EKKEHART
MULLER-RAPPARD & M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, EUROPEAN INTER-STATE COOPERATION IN CRIM-

INAL MATTERS, LA COOPARATION INTER-ETATIQUE EUROPtENNE EN MATI]RE P.NALE

(3
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why the eighteen Council of Europe Conventions on Inter-State
Cooperation in Penal Matters are of a significantly higher technical legal quality than the international instruments elaborated
both by the League of Nations and the United Nations. 2
Considering, that the essence of international criminal law
enforcement is the "indirect enforcement scheme,"' 3 which relies
on states to carry out their enforcement duties by means of
these enforcement provisions, the specificity of these modalities
should be paramount. For the first time in a United Nations instrument, the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances14 contains detailed provisions delineating a state's enforcement obligations. A broader regional convention, the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds
from Crime contains equally as detailed provisions.'8

Vols. 1987), reprinted in Vol. III appendix, pp. 1-30 in English and pp. 1-32 in French.
" The instruments generated by the Council of Europe are of a significantly better
technical legal quality than other international instruments for three primary reasons.
First, the 23 nations that comprise the Council of Europe are more cohesive than the
100-plus nations that participated in the drafting of the UN Drug Convention. As a result, the Council of Europe is not as concerned with maximizing the number of signatures as is the United Nations. Second, the Council of Europe, as with most regional lawmaking bodies, does not face the problem of conflicting legal and criminal justice systems. From a practical standpoint, the legal systems of the 23 nations that make up the
Council of Europe are largely the same. Finally, the Council of Europe has the ability to
spend more time, exert more effort, and expend greater resources in the conclusion of a
treaty than does a body like the United Nations. Moreover, the Council of Europe is
consulted by more experts than the United Nations and has the benefit of more general
expertise and input.
11 The "indirect enforcement scheme" derives from the notion that states obligate
themselves, through various regional and international instruments, to carry out the enforcement of international criminal law. The "direct enforcement scheme," on the other
hand, presupposes the existence of an international criminal code, an international criminal court, and the existence of international enforcement machinery. For a thorough
discussion of both schemes and the Draft International Criminal Code and the Draft
Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, see M.CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR A INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL

(1987).
14Supra note 10.
1 COE Convention, supra note 8. The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime sets forth specific measures that the signatory parties must adopt, such as confiscation measures, COE Convention, at Chap. II, art. 2, investigative measures, id. at Chap. II, art. 3, special
investigative powers and techniques, id. at Chap. 11, art. 4, legal remedies to preserve the
rights of the accused, id. at Chap. II, art. 5. Chapter II, Article 6 describes the type of
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Because substantive international criminal law is enforced
indirectly by the cooperation of member-states and by their duties arising out of the various international instruments, one of
the most important provisions in these instruments should concern criminal jurisdiction. Surprisingly, only seventy-one of the
315 international instruments contain a provision on criminal jurisdiction.16 While a few of these instruments identify ways to
resolve jurisdictional conflicts, most fail to do so. 7 For example,
the 1988 International Maritime Organization International
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, a treaty particularly concerned
with issues of jurisdiction for offenses aboard civilian ships on
the high seas, fails to resolve these problems."
International criminal law instruments have also failed to
recognize the importance of police cooperation to effective international law enforcement. Although a significant portion of mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties (and other instruments which contain such clauses) rely on police work and interstate police cooperation, international police cooperation has,
thus far, been governed by informal arrangements based upon
the traditional bonds of those engaged in police work."9
laundering activities that are to be criminalized.
Under Chapter III the signatory parties must assist each other in the identification
and tracing of property used in the commission of any offences and the proceeds derived
therefrom. Id. at Chap. III, § 2, art. 8. A party may transmit information to another state
even if that information is not requested by the latter, if the information may provide
assistance in the carrying out of criminal investigations. Id. at Chap. III, § 2, art. 10.
Chapter III also contains detailed provisions concerning the request by one state to confiscate property used in the commisssion of a crime and the proceeds derived therefrom,
which is situated in another state. Id. at Chap. III, § 3, art 11-12, § 4, art. 13-17.
10 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Characteristicsof InternationalCriminal Law Conventions,
in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 10 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986). For a thorough discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, see Christopher L. Blakesley, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction,in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE 3 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,

1987) and

HAIDONG

LI,

DIE PRINZIPIEN DES INTERNATIONALEN STRAFRECHTS (1991).

Issues of criminal jurisdiction plagued the Achille Lauro incident. See Gerald P.
McGinley, The Achille Lauro Case: A Study in Crisis Law, Policy and Management, in
LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: US PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 323 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed. 1988).
:, Supra note 8.
9, Jean Nepote, The Role of an InternationalCriminal Police in the Context of an
International Criminal Court and Police Cooperation with Respect to International
Crimes, in 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 682
(M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973).
17
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Despite the steady rise in international police cooperation
since the 1920's, not a single international convention governs or
regulates inter-state cooperation among police agencies. Even
ICPO-Interpol (Interpol),2 0 with its limited jurisdiction and authority in the area of international law enforcement, has usually
operated on a voluntary basis in agreements between domestic
police agencies and Interpol. Since the 1960's, increases in drug
trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, and transnational criminality have resulted in heightened interaction between Interpol
and national police agencies.2 1 Nevertheless, such cooperation
has been relegated to bilateral and informal arrangements which
22
do not have the status of treaties.
The work done by police and intelligence agencies is crucial
to the prevention, control and suppression of international,
transnational and national criminality. However, absent regulation in international conventions, there are dangers inherent in
unstructured and legally uncontrolled police activity across national borders. Likely dangers include: human rights abuses,2"
20

The International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO-Interpol) came into exis-

tence in 1923 in order to promote mutual assistance and cooperation in law enforcement
and the suppression of international crime. Mary J. Grotenroth, INTERPOL's Role in
InternationalLaw Enforcement, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: U.S.
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 375 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988). For a discussion of Interpol's

role in the suppression of terrorism, see

BUDIMIR BABOVic, INTERPOL FACE AU TERRORISME

(1990). In 1971, the United Nations Economic and Social Council determined that Interpol should be considered an intergovernmental organization and should no longer be
classified as a non-governmental organization. This classification was reiterated in 1982
in a letter from the United Nations legal adviser to the Interpol Secretary General. As of
1989, 150 nations were members of Interpol. See BUDIMIR BABOViC, COUNTRIES' DATES OF
ACCESSION TO INTERPOL 4-6, 35 (1990).
11 Mary J. Grotenroth, Interpol'sRole in InternationalLaw Enforcement, in LEGAL
RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS

375-76 (M. Cherif

Bassiouni ed., 1988)
21 In response to terrorism and international criminality, the European Economic
Community, via the "Trevi Group" and "Pompidou Group," has engaged in the interstate sharing of intelligence and police technology, exchange of police staff and information, and cooperation in public security. Like Interpol, both groups operate on the basis
of operational police cooperation. Thus, neither group established a legal basis or an
institutional structure for inter-state police cooperation. Ekkehart Miller-Rappard, The

European Response to International Terrorism, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM: U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 409-10 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988).
23 Of particular concern in the realm of human rights are incidences of torture and
kidnapping. For a discussion of the role of human rights in international police cooperation, and in relation to Interpol in particular, see Budimir Babovic, Interpol and Human
Rights, INT'L CRIMINAL POLICE REv. 4 (July-August 1990).
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violations of privacy rights24 and, at times, breaches of national
sovereignty.2"
The absence of provisions governing inter-state police cooperation is particularly perplexing in that each of the six modalities of inter-state cooperation applicable to international, transnational and national crimes implicitly relies upon effective
police cooperation. The inclusion of such a provision in mutual
legal assistance and extradition treaties is important in two respects. First, a clause on inter-state police cooperation would increase the effectiveness of international law enforcement as a
whole. Second, regulation of police authority would promote the
observation of human rights norms and standards and would
also prevent abuses. Another means of achieving the same goals
would be the conclusion of a multilateral convention regulating
the authority and role of the police in international law
enforcement.
Enforcement Assumptions and Policies
As stated above, substantive international criminal law so
far relies on the "indirect enforcement scheme" by establishing
international duties upon states who have voluntarily accepted
certain treaty obligations to enforce these obligations through
their domestic criminal justice processes. The choice of one of
two enforcement approaches is left to the state in what has now
become the accepted maxim aut dedere aut judicare: to prosecute or extradite.2 6 Some see them as alternative and others see
' The use, by national police agencies, of computer databases to compile data on
offenders gives rise to personal privacy concerns and the need to protect personal data
privacy. For an analysis of government use of computer databases in the battle against
terrorism, see Yearwood, Data Bank Control, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM: U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 249-76 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed. 1988) and
Budimir Babovic, Interpol and Human Rights, INT'L CRIMINAL POLICE REV. 4 (July-August 1990) (discussing computerization and the protection of personal privacy and individual rights).
"I An example of this problem, which also implicates human rights and privacy concerns, is the cooperation between states in arranging the kidnapping or abduction of
relators across national orders as an alternative to extradition. See 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 189-246 (2d ed.
1987).
2 See 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN UNITED STATES LAW
AND PRACTICE § 2-3 (2d ed., 1987). See also Decian Costello, International Terrorism
and the Development of the Principleaut dedere aut judicare, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 483
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them as cumulative.27
To effectively carry out these obligations, states rely on international criminal procedural law, which relies, in turn, on modalities and techniques of inter-state penal cooperation. Any obligations, however, are limited to the extent and the manner in
which these modalities are embodied in a state's respective domestic legislation. The very obligation to prosecute or extradite
is, therefore, dependent upon what a state's national criminal
justice system permits and is capable of executing. In fact, no
international standards, applicable to states, exist for carrying
out the state's duty to prosecute. Furthermore, there are no penalties contained in international instruments for any international or transnational crime. There are, however, some guidelines in certain instruments such as the four Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949 and the two Additional Protocols of 1977, providing that "grave breaches" receive a certain
type of penalty which is different from other "breaches. 28 Thus,
the implementation of international obligations is at best
imperfect.
There are, however, other international implementation
mechanisms which include non-penal modalities that do not em(1975); Edward M. Wise, Some Problems of Extradition, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 709, 720-23
(1969); Edward M. Wise, Prolegomenon to the Principles of International Criminal
Law, 16 N.Y.L.F. 562, 575 (1970).
'" See CHRISTINE VAN
DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO ExTRADITION: THE DELICATE PROBLEM OF BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE

INTERNATIONAL WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 8, 158-62 (1980). See also Edward M. Wise, Book
Review, 30 AM. J. CoMP. L. 362, 370 n. 64 (1982). The issue was also discussed at the
Eleventh International Congress on Comparative Law. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, General Report on the JuridicalStatus of the Requested State Denying Extradition, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW,
reprinted in 30 AM. J. COMP. L. (1982).
2" Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 6
U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed' Forces at Sea, signed at Geneva,
12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 6 U.S.T. 3217; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T.
3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, opened for signature at Berne, 12 December 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex I;
Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, opened for signature at Berne, 12 December 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex II.
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ploy domestic criminal justice processes.2 9 These non-penal modalities are compliance-inducement mechanisms, whereas enforcement modalities rely on the coercive techniques of the
domestic criminal justice processes of states and cooperating inter-governmental bodies like Interpol.
Integrating the Modalities of Inter-State Cooperation for the
Prevention, Control and Suppression of International, Transnational and Domestic Criminality
The six modalities of inter-state cooperation, as described
above,30 arise under diverse law-making processes, namely: international, regional, and national ones. 1 However, even within the
context of these three law-making processes, the resulting prodto See Gerhard Mueller & Douglas J. Besharov, Evolution and Enforcement of International Criminal Law, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 59 (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1986); Gerhard Mueller & Douglas J. Besharov, The Existence of International Criminal Law and its Evolution to the Point to its Enforcement Crisis, in 1 A
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds.,
1973).
s0 These modalities, which were listed on pages 3-4, are (1) recognition of foreign
penal judgments (2) extradition (3) mutual legal assistance in penal matters (4) transfers
of penal proceedings (5) transfer of prisoners and (6)the seizure and forfeiture of the
illicit proceeds of crime.
01 See generally Ekkehart Mueller-Rappard, The European System 95 (Judicial Assistance and Mutual Cooperation in Penal Matters); Lech Gardocki, The Socialist System 133 (Judicial Assistance and Mutual Cooperation in Penal Matters); Alan Ellis &
Robert L. Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 151 (Judicial Assistance and Mutual Cooperation in Penal Matters); Dietrich
Oehler, The European System 199 (Recognition of Foreign Penal Judgments); Helmut
Epp, The European Convention 253 (Transfer of Prisoners); Julian Schutte, The European System 319 (Transfer of Criminal Proceedings); D. Spinellis, A European Perspective 351 (Securing Evidence Abroad); Dominique Poncet & Paul Gully-Hart, The European Model 461 (Extradition), in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed. 1987). See also Gerhart Mueller, Enforcement Models of International
Criminal Law, in NEW HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 85 (1985); Julian
Schutte, Expanding Scope of Extradition and Judicial Assistance and Cooperation in
Penal Matters, in NEW HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 79 (1985); UN Drug
Convention, supra note 4, and the COE Convention, supra note 6.
The COE Convention, unlike the UN Drug Convention, is not limited to drug related offenses. Rather, the COE Convention defines a "predicate offense" as "any criminal offense as a result which proceeds were generated that may become the subject of an
offence as defined in Article 6 of this Convention." Art. 1(e). The COE Convention is
intended to combat all forms of serious crimes; especially drug offenses, arms dealing,
terrorism or other offenses which generate large profits. See Final Activity Report: Draft
Explanatory Report on the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation
of the Proceeds From Crime, July 25, 1990, at 3.
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uct differs in scope and legal technique while lacking consistency
and systematization. What is needed, instead, is the integration
of these modalities into a comprehensive codification that would
permit the cumulative and alternative utilization of these modalities to ensure their enhanced effectiveness. In this respect
the national legislative approach adopted by Austria,3 2 Germany"3 and Switzerland,3 4 which integrates all of these modalities of inter-state penal cooperation, is a valuable model. Hungary, Czechoslovakia and other countries are also considering
the integrated approach in their codification reforms. Under this
approach, the modalities of inter-state cooperation operate like
multiple gears in a single gear-box, allowing states to shift from
one modality to the next instead of being limited to only one
gear at a time. This self same approach is needed at the regional
and international levels.
While a number of regional and sub-regional multilateral
agreements have been developed, their elaboration has been
piecemeal. None of these agreements integrate the various modalities into a comprehensive, codified form of inter-state penal
cooperation."

3' Austrian
Law on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. Bundesgesetz vom 4
Dezember 1979 ober die Auslieferung und die Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen (Auslieferungs und Rechtshilfegesetz -ARHG), BGBI. Nr. 529/1979. See also K. SCHWAIGHOFER, AusLIEFERUNG UND INTERNATIONALES STRAFRECHT (1988); R. LINKE, et al., INTERNATIONALES
STRAFRECHT (1981).
33 Germany (Act Concerning International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters)
"Gesetz ober die Internationale Rechtsthilfe in Strafrecht" of December 31, 1982, entered into force January 7, 1983, Bundesgesatzblatt 1982, Teil I, No. 2071. (Federal Official Gazette 1982, part I, p. 2071). The act replaced the German Extradition Act of 1929
and provides for comprehensive measures of extradition and other forms of mutual assistance in penal matters, including execution of foreign sentences. See OTTO LAGODNY, DIE
RECHTESSTELLUNG DES AUSZULIEFERNDEN IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (1987);
THEO VOGLER, AUSLIEFERUNGRECHT AND GUNDGESETZ (1970); Theo Vogler, The Expanding Scope of InternationalJudicial Assistance and Cooperation in Legal Matters,
DIE FRIEDENS-WARTE, BAND 66, Heft 3-4, 287 (1986).
14 See Swiss Federal Law on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
Entraide Internationale en Matiire P6nale of 20 March 1981.
"5 See Rec. No. R/87/1 of the Committee of Ministers of Justice to the Member
States on Inter-State Cooperation in Penal Matters among Member States, (adopted by
Committee of Ministers of Justice, Council of Europe 19/1/87); EKKEHART MULLER-RAP-

PARD & M. CHERIF BASSIOUNi, EUROPEAN INTER-STATE COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
(LA COOPtRATION INTER-ETATIQUE EUROP.ENNE EN MATIARE PkNALE) (3 Vols. 1987), reprinted in Vol. III appendix, pp. 1-30 in English and pp. 1-32 in French. A special Committee of Experts has since been established to work on this project.
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At the regional level, the Council of Europe has been considering such an integrated approach since 1987 on the basis of a
project developed by an ad hoc Committee of Experts. This
committee convened twice at the International Institute of
Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences in Siracusa, Italy. There,
the Committee of Experts determined that the Council of Europe should integrate all of the European Conventions into a
single, integrated code of inter-state penal cooperation. This
conclusion was supported by a Resolution of the Council of Ministers of Justice in 1987. In addition, the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice developed such a model code in 1988.36 Regrettably, it has not received attention by the Arab governments, as
those states have not yet made international penal cooperation a
priority.
The integrated approach has been accepted at a relatively
slow pace within international and regional organizations. This
hesitation stems from the familiarity and comfort which government representatives feel toward the bilateral approach and
with the process of gradually strengthening modalities in a
piecemeal fashion. 7 Efforts by a few scholars and government
experts to spur the multinational integrated approach has met
with some reluctance in international conferences because some
government representatives feel that such an approach may not
be politically acceptable to their superiors.
Due, in part, to diplomatic timidity, regional and international organizations have not advanced beyond the traditional
modalities discussed above. Even these modalities have not been
made to work well, as they are clearly inadequate in coping with
increased international, transnational and national criminality,
particularly with respect to the new international manifestations
36 See Council of Arab Ministers of Justice: A Collection of the Council's Documents, No. 2, January 1988, 96-148.
" As an example, see the U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Treaty on Extradition of 1986;
accord Abraham D. Sofaer, The PoliticalOffense Exception and Terrorism, 15 DENY. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 125 (1986). Other commentators opposed the treaty. M. Cherif Bassiouni, "The PoliticalOffense Exception" Revisited: Extradition Between the U.S. and
the U.K. - A Choice Between Friendly CooperationAmong Allies and Sound Law and
Policy, 15 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 255 (1987); Christopher L. Blakesley, The Evisceration of the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 15 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109
(1986).
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of organized crime, drug traffic, and terrorism."8 Consequently,
international, transnational, and national criminal phenomena
are not controlled as effectively as possible due to unwarranted
political and diplomatic considerations, which limit states in
their international penal cooperation.
It must be admitted, however, that this state of affairs is
mainly due to the fact that government officials, whether in ministries of foreign affairs or justice, are not sufficiently knowledgeable in the field of international criminal law to envision better
and more effective means of international cooperation. Instead,
they persist in traditional ways, with their concomitant weaknesses, or they seek to develop less than lawful methods of accomplishing that which they can not seem to accomplish lawfully. 9 These practices pose very serious problems in the world
of international penal cooperation.
Furthermore, the administrative and bureaucratic divisions,
which exist among the national organs of law enforcement and
prosecution impair the effectiveness of inter-state penal enforcement. National criminal justice systems consist of different subsystems. The most common divisions are among law enforcement, prosecution, judiciary, and corrections. "° In addition,
within each sub-system, there are still separate bureaucratic and
administrative units. All too frequently, each of these sub-systems is a self-contained entity with its own peculiar bureaucratic
and administrative exigencies with each having a life of its own.
As a result, each sub-system defends its respective turf and
supports its own methods, goals and purposes; all of which leads
to difficulties of integration, and ultimately, to the fragmenta"

See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Organized Crime and Terrorism, 4 EMORY J. INT'L L. 90

(1990) adopted from the author's report to the Eighth United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Havana, Aug-Sept. 1990) Al
Conf.144/NGO 1. See also, effective national and international action against: (a) organized crime; (b) terrorist criminal activities A/CONF.144/15. Report of the Interregional
preparatory meeting ... on topic I: Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in the Context of Development: Realities and Perspectives of International Cooperation, A/
CONF.144/IPM.1.
80 Consider instances of abduction or kidnapping when states are unsuccessful in
attempts to extradite particular relators. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 1 INTERNATIONAL ExTRADITION IN UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 187-246 (2d rev. ed. 1987).
"0 A fifth possible sub-system is social services, although social services are usually
part of some or all of the others.
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tion of the criminal justice system. 4 ' Conversely, criminal organizations and individual offenders are not similarly hindered by
the inefficiencies of bureaucratic and administrative divisions.
The international response to criminal phenomena which do
not stop at national boundaries is piecemeal, divided, and ineffective. More significantly, few states make the effort to use all
the existing modalities of inter-state cooperation and even fewer
states seek to develop new modalities of cooperation in other
fields. Such new modalities could include the following:
i. sharing law enforcement intelligence;
ii. increasing teamwork in inter-state law enforcement
cooperation;
iii. tracing international financial transactions;
iv. developing effective national financial controls to trace proceeds of illicit activities; and
v. developing regional "judicial spaces." '
None of the above, however, should be construed or applied in a
manner that violates international and regional human rights
" A thorough discussion of the effects of bureaucratic sub-systems on the administration of criminal justice is contained in a report, prepared by this writer and presented
to the Seventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of
Offenders (Milan, Italy Aug. 26 - Sept. 6 1985) at 40-43, A/Conf.121/NG0 1 (1986).
42 This latter idea was floated within the Council of Europe by France in the late
1970's but was discarded within that regional context. It has survived in discussions during 1989 among certain countries within that region, namely the Benelux countries and
Germany. In the Andean Region, a parliamentary Commission is considering that option
and is also working on the elaboration of an integrated code of interregional cooperation
which would include the traditional modalities described above. Supra note 3. See Christine Van den Wyngaert, L'Espace JudiciareEurop~en Face a L'Euro-Terrorismeet la
Sauvegarde des Droits Fondamentaux, 3 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE CRIMINOLOGIE ET DE
POLICE TECHNIQUE 289 (1980); Christine Van den Wyngaert, L'Espace Judiciaire
Europen: Vers une Fissure au Sein du Conseil de L'Europe?, 61 REV. DROIT P§NAL ET
DE CRIM. 511 (1981); de Gouttes, Variations sur L'Espace JudiciarePnal Europten, 33
RECEUIL DALLOZ SIREY 245 (1990); de Gouttes, Vers un Espace Judiciare Ptnal PanEuropben?, 22 RECEUIL DALLOZ SIREY 154 (1991); Council of Europe, InternationalCooperation in the Prosecutionand Punishment of Acts of Terrorism: Recommendation No.
R(82)1, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 15 January
1982 and Explanatory memorandum (Strasbourg 1983); M. Marchetti, INSTITUZIONI
EUROPEE E LO'ITA AL TERRORISMO (1986); F. Mosconi, L'Accordo Di Dublino Del 4/12/
1979, Le Communita Europee E La Repressione Del Terrorismo, LA LEGISLAZIONE
PENALE, 543 (No. 3, 1986) referring to the European Judicial Space. See also CONSlGLIO
SUPERIOR DELLA MAGISTRATURA, ESTRADIZIONE E SPAzzIo GIURIDIco EUROPEO (1979);
SCHENGEN: INTERNATIONALIZATION
GEES, SECURITY AND THE POLICE

OF CENTRAL CHAPTERS OF THE LAW ON ALIENS, REFU-

(H. Meijers et al. 1991).
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norms and standards.43
A multilateral or regional integrated approach is an eminently desirable course of conduct and both the Council of Europe and the United Nations could significantly contribute to
the field of international criminal justice by developing such a
model. Any such model should also include new approaches to
the problems of criminal jurisdiction.
The United Nations General Assembly adopted a set of
measures approved by the Eighth United Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (Havana, AugustSeptember, 1990) which included the following: measures for international cooperation for crime prevention and criminal justice;44 a model treaty on extradition; 45 a model treaty on mutual
assistance in criminal matters;4" and a model treaty on the
transfer of proceedings in criminal matters. 47 These model treaties are expected to provide a useful framework for states interested in negotiating bilateral arrangements in these areas; however, they are too general and are not integrated.48
The Organization of American States has, in the last few
years, followed in the footsteps of the Council of Europe and
developed, inter alia: 1) the American Convention on Human
Rights; 2) the Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of
Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International Significance; 3) various instruments concerning extradition, asylum and international penal law; and 4) the establishment of the Inter-American
Drug Abuse Control Commission via the Inter-American Program of Action of Rio de Janeiro Against the Illicit Use and Pro" See 49 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL (No. 3 1978) and in particular the
General Report of Professor Stefan Trechsel id. at 541.
G. A. Res. 45/107 (1990).
G. A. Res. 45/116 (1990).
40 G. A. Res. 45/117 (1990).
4 G. A. Res. 45/118 (1990).
, For a discussion of the differences in approach and effectiveness between the
United Nations and regional bodies, like the Council of Europe, see supra note 12. Despite these institutional differences, and in recognition of the fact that the United Nations has not adopted an integrated approach, this writer has propounded such an approach in a report submitted to a Committee of Experts Meeting at ISISC (Siracusa)
June 1990 and presented to the Eighth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention
and the Treatment of Offenders (Havana, Cuba, Aug.-Sept. 1990) A/Conf.144/NG05, 31
July 1990, reprinted in 15 NOVA L. REV. 354 (1991).
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duction of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and
Traffic Therein.4 9 Qualitatively, the European Conventions on
Inter-State Cooperation5" are moving into the stage of second
generation, whereas the OAS and U.N. are still at the stage of
first generation. However, we are now at a time when we need a
third generation of international instruments.
II.

PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES FOR THE INCREASE IN

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE "INDIRECT ENFORCEMENT SCHEME" 5

1

In order to render the international system of prevention,
control and suppression of domestic, transnational and international criminality more effective, the following recommendations
are offered:
1. Recognition of the rule aut dedere aut judicare as a civitas maxima5 2 and development of international minimum standards of compliance, including standards for effective, good faith
prosecution and extradition;
2. Recognition of a ranking of criminal jurisdiction in this
order: territoriality, nationality, passive personality, protected
interest, and universality and development of rules and mechanisms for conflict resolution, including compulsory adjudication
before an International Criminal Court, the International Court

For a synopsis of OAS activities in the area of inter-state penal cooperation, see
Dr. Hugo Caminos, Asst. Sec'y of Legal Affairs for the Organization of American States,
Comments to the Committee of Experts on International Criminal Policy for the Prevention and Control of Transnational and International Criminality and for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Siracusa, Italy June 24-28, 1990) (on file in the
office of M. Cherif Bassiouni, DePaul University College of Law).
10 See EKKEHART MULLER-RAPPARD & M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, EUROPEAN INTER-STATE
COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, LA COOPtRATION

INTER-ETATIQUE EUROPIkENNE EN

MATItRE PANALE (3 Vols. 1987), reprinted in Vol. III appendix, pp. 1-30 in English and
pp. 1-32 in French.
"' The author submitted a report on this topic to a Committee of Experts Meeting
at ISISC (Siracusa) June 1990 and to the Eighth United Nations Congress on Crime
Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders (Havana, Cuba, Aug.-Sept. 1990) A/
Conf.144/NG05, 31 July 1990, reprinted in 15 NOVA L. REV. 354 (1991). The International Law Commission has subsequently reported favorably on this position. See Report
of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Third Session, 29 April
- 19 July 1991, U.N. GAOR 46th Sess. Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991).
"2 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN UNITED STATES LAW AND

§ 2-3 (2d rev. ed. 1987); Gerhard Mueller, InternationalCriminal Law: Civitas
Maxima, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1 (1983).
PRACTICE
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of Justice or regional tribunals;5 3
3. Granting individual victims the right to initiate prosecution as partie civile, including countries other than that of their
nationality; s"
4. Codification of international and transnational crimes
and their inclusion in the national legislation of all countries; ss

53

See Christopher Blakesley, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, in 2
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1987); HAIDONG Li,

CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE 3
DES INTERNATIONALEN

STRAFRECHTS

INTERNATIONAL
DIE PRINZIPIEN

(1991).

" This idea was accepted by the United Nations Committee on Crime Prevention
and Control on the basis of a proposal made by a Committee of Experts meeting at
ISISC (Siracusa) for the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on Basic
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N.
GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 213, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985). See INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTIONS OF VICTIMS, 7 NOUVELLEs ETUDE PkNALES (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988).
11 See 60 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DRorr P'NAL (No. 1-2, 1989) and in particular
the General Reports of Professors Triffterer at 29 and Gardocki at 89. The Fifteenth

International Penal Law Congress, held in Vienna, October 1989, adopted a resolution to
that effect. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH INTERNATIONAL PENAL LAW CONGRESS

(1991).
The Association Internationale de Droit Penal (AIDP) has been a leader in this effort since 1926. See 5 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT P.NAL 275 (1928). The Association's former president made contributions to this effort prior to 1926 in his work VESPASIAN V. PELLA, LA CODIFICATION DU DROr P9NAL INTERNATIONAL (1922). Subsequently the
AIDP sponsored a project directed by the author, then its Secretary-General, which was
presented to the Sixth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and The Treatment of Offenders (Caracas, Venezuela, Aug.-Sept. 1980) and published as M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI,

INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL

LAW:

A

DRAFT

INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT

(1980), translated into French by Christine Van den Wyngaert as Projet de Code Pnal
International, 51 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT P.NAL (vols. 1-2, 1980), which was
followed by a symposium issue of commentaries, 51 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
PNAL (vols. 3-4, 1980); the Draft Code was translated into Spanish by Professor Jose
Luis de la Cuesta and was published as DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL PROYECTO DE
CODIGO PENAL INTERNACIONAL (1983); and it was translated into Hungarian by the Hungarian Ministry of Justice in 1984. A revised edition was published in 1987 as M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND A DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL

(1987).

In 1947, the United Nations began working on the codification of certain international crimes and produced in 1954 a Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 9 at 9, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954), reprinted in II YB INT'L L. COM. 112-22 (1954); since 1982, see the annual reports of the
International Law Commission each reprinted in the Yearbook. For a recent assessment,
see Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Developments and Future Prospects, in 1 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 83 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed. 1986); Edward M. Wise, Perspectives
and Approaches, id. at 101; Sharon A. Williams, The Draft Code of Offences Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, id. at 109. See also FARHAD MALEKIAN, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW (2 vols. 1991); Edward M. Wise, International Crimes and Domestic
Criminal Law, 38 DEPAUL L.REv. 923 (1989); DIETRICH OEHLER, INTERNATIONALES
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5. Developing means by which to detect abuses of power by
those public officials who may commit international offences or
who, by purposeful omission, are58 derelict of their duties to enforce international criminal law;
6. Integrating modalities for inter-state penal cooperation in
a codified fashion. This should be done in specialized international and regional instruments and in national legislation for
application to international and transnational crimes,5 7 as well as
to domestic crimes requiring inter-state cooperation;
7. Development of a convention on inter-state cooperation
between law enforcement agencies setting forth the means,
methods and limitations of such cooperation, including the protection of fundamental human rights and the right to privacy.
This systematized approach should be included in an integrated
code of inter-state penal cooperation;
8. The consistent and specific inclusion of the integrated
modalities of enforcement in all substantive international criminal law conventions;
9. Development of new modalities of inter-state cooperation
and enforcement mechanisms similar to those outlined above;
10. Development of education and training programs in international criminal law at the level of legal education as well as
within public agencies 58 and specialization programs for judges,
prosecutors and law enforcement officials in international criminal law aspects of their work.59 A specialized cadre of legal tech-

STRAFRECHT

(2d. ed. 1983);

CLAUDE LOMBOIS, DROIT PtNAL INTERNATIONAL

STEFAN GLASER, LE DROIT PANAL INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONEL

(2d. ed. 1979);

(2 vols. 1977-79); Leslie
L.J. 560 (1976); Yoram

C. Green, An International Criminal Code Now? 3 DALHOUSIE
Dinstein, InternationalCriminal Law, 5 ISRAEL YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS 55 (1975);

OTTo TRIFFTERER, DOGMATISCHE UNTERSUCHENGEN ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DES MATERIELLEN
VOLKRESTRAFRECHT SEIT NURNBERG (1966); ANTONIO QUINTANO-RIPPOLLES, TRATADO DE

E INTERNACIONAL PENAL (2 vols. 1955-57).
See supra note 54.
See supra notes 32 through 35.
88 See United Nations Guiding Principles for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in the Context of Development and a New International Economic Order adopted by
the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders (hereinafter Guiding Principles from the Seventh United Nations Congress on
Crime Prevention)(Milano, Italy, 26 August - 6 September 1985) A/Conf.121/22/Rev./1.
DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL
5

For a Commentary on the "Guiding Principles," see 6

NOUVELLES ETUDES PtNALES

121

(1985).
" Guiding Principles from the Seventh United Nations Congress on Crime Preven-
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nicians should be developed in each government and within international, regional and inter-governmental organizations to
draft instruments and provisions on international criminal law;
11. International, regional, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations and academic institutions should develop educational, training, professional and practical materials
in international criminal law which can be widely used by all
professional categories;"'
12. Development of networks of information and criminal
justice data-sharing within states and as between states;"1
13. Providing and requiring increased technical assistance to
states;62 and

14. Development of regional centers for the accumulation of
specialized library materials, documents, and research with the
capacity to provide technical legal advice to government and
public agencies and to academic and scientific organizations.
All of the above recommendations must be applied in conformity with international, regional and national human rights norms
and standards. This caveat is particularly important in light of
some law enforcement branches. In this respect, it should be
stated that the observance of human rights norms and standards
does not reduce the efficiency or effectiveness of the criminal
justice system. The inefficiency of criminal justice derives from a
variety of other factors.
Suffice it to observe that if any successful industrial or commercial enterprise, in today's world of modern management
techniques, was administered like many of the criminal justice
systems, that enterprise would cease to be successful and would
eventually become bankrupt. The symptoms of the bankruptcy
of our criminal justice systems are all too evident, from law enforcement to corrections, as almost every aspect needs reform.
III.

CONCLUSION

Since the end of World War II, international, transnational,
and national incidents of crime and the number of offenders
tion, supra note 58.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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have consistently increased. The distinction between the increase in the incidents of crime and the number of offenders is
critical because any system of criminal justice is based on substantial compliance with the law. Thus, the system is only
equipped to deal with a particular, limited number of offenders.
As the number of offenders increases, the criminal justice sys.tem's resources become strained. Eventually, the system becomes unable to handle the increased volume of offenders and
ultimately breaks down. 3
At the inter-state level, other factors which have enhanced
this phenomenon are the extraordinary ease of inter-state movement of persons and goods and the free-flow of financial transactions in a worldwide banking system that provides maximum
flexibility and anonymity. National criminal justice systems,
which are no longer capable of meeting their domestic challenges, must face the added difficulties of pursuing offenders,
and seeking evidence in multiple states. However, the lack of expert personnel and the limited resources allocated by governments to such endeavors and to inter-state penal cooperation
render these processes slow and ineffective.
Governments believe that the problems in extradition and
other forms of international cooperation stem from approaches
which tend to elevate the procedural rights of the requested person to the detriment of the process. 4 The argument is not entirely without merit, but it is limited to occasional effects and
ignores endemic and operational causes. One of these causes is
the limited number of experts among judges, prosecutors, and
administrative officials working in this field. They face a large
In fact, the increased number of offenders has caused many states to decriminalize certain activities in a variety of categories. These categories of offenses are, instead,
treated in the administrative law rather than in the criminal law context. Such treatment
has extended to the development of alternative modalities designed to ease the added
strain on the criminal justice system, such as restitution, victim compensation, and arbitration in crimes which involve patrimonial and personal injury matters. For example,
the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers recently adopted a directive concerning
the establishment of arbitral tribunals for claims arising out of the 1990 Convention on
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime. Rec. No. R
(91) 12 (9 September 1991).
64 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to Proceedings of the InternationalConference on Extradition held at ISISC (Siracusa), 62 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
PEkNAL (Nos. 1-2. 1991).
63
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volume of cases with limited resources and personnel.
. Probably the most serious of all problems is bureaucratic
divisions which burden the administration of criminal justice
and sometimes paralyze the system. Even those law enforcement
agencies which have exhibited increased capacity for inter-state
cooperation have become less concerned with the proper application of the law. As some of these public officials engage in
questionable or unlawful practices such as abduction, they compel greater procedural rigidity and tighter judicial controls. The
cumulative effect of these and other systematic and operational
deficiencies reduces the speed and effectiveness of the processes
of inter-state penal cooperation.
Operational problems, though more visible, are not, however, the most serious causes of the systemic problems in interstate penal cooperation. 5 Many states still favor bilateral treaties and make extradition and other forms of cooperation a consequence of, and contingent upon, their political relations. Thus,
governments reduce procedural barriers to extradition and other
forms of cooperation with friendly nations and increase these
barriers with less friendly ones." Extradition and other forms of
cooperation are therefore still a process of political accommodation. They should be a judicial process based on an international
civitas maxima free from political considerations.6 7
A new approach is needed whereby modalities of inter-state
cooperation are regarded as an objective and politically neutral
international judicial process which preserves international standards of legality and human rights protections in its judicial and
administrative workings. It is particularly important to under65 Other problems derive from the fact that today's approach is the same as it was
in 1268 B.C. when Ramses II and King Hatussilli included an extradition clause in their
peace treaty. Not only was this the first extradition clause in the history of treaties, but
it was also the first, and to the best of my knowledge, the only major peace treaty to
contain such a provision. What was deemed a necessary component of peace between
nations 3,260 years ago is still valid today; even though not entirely for the same reasons.
See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 1 INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN UNITED STATES LAW & PRAC-

TICE 6 (2d rev. ed. 1987).

"8 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Political Offense Exception Revisited: Extradition
Between the U.S. and the U.K.-A Choice Between Friendly Cooperation Among Allies
and Sound Law 'andPolicy, 15 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 255 (1987)
17 See Albin Eser, Edward M. Wise & Christine Van den Wyngaert, in 62 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PtNAL (Nos. 1-2, 1991).
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stand that the protection of individual human rights is not and
should not be placed in a confrontational relationship with the
effectiveness of the process.
Multilateralism should replace the archaic inefficient and
politicized bilateralism, and all modalities of inter-state penal
cooperation should be integrated. Thus, multilateral treaties and
national legislations should integrate the following modalities:
extradition; legal assistance; transfer of criminal proceedings;
transfer of prisoners; transfer of sentences; recognition of foreign
penal judgments; tracing, freezing and seizing of assets derived
from criminal activity; and, law-enforcement and prosecutorial
cooperation. Only then will these complementary processes work
to the benefit of ensuring efficiency without sacrificing proper
legal procedures and violating individual human rights.6 8 Lastly,
we must not forget the need to establish an International Criminal Court.6 9
Without the intellectual and technical contribution of scholars and experts and without the leadership of international and
regional organizations, states will probably continue to pursue
familiar courses charted by years of practice, even though that
practice has proven unsatisfactory. Instead, states should explore new courses in the hopes of discovering the best route to a
brave new world of effective inter-state penal cooperation.
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